CSIS presents Obama new Cybersecurity strategy proposal

Today, the Centre for the Strategic and International  Studies of the United States (CSIS) published the report Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency. 

The report is the result of a huge work, led by Jim Lewis (CSIS). Among the various proposals, there is the creation of a National Office for Cyberspace (NOC), by merging the existing National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) and the Joint Inter-Agency Cyber Task Force.

The report also says NOC should secure industrial control systems (SCADA), such as those used by Critical Infrastructure, Power and manufacturing plants, by developing regulations they would be forced to follow. 

Here is a summary of the recommendations: 

1. Create a comprehensive national security strategy for cyberspace
   
2. Lead from the Whitehouse: with the creation of a new office for cyberspace in the Executive Office of the President
   
3. Reinvent the Public-Private Partnerships: focus on Trust and on operational activities
   
4. Regulate Cyberspace: voluntary action is not enough!
   
5. Authenticate digital Identities
   
6. Modernize Authorities (and law)
   
7. Use acquisition policies to improve security: buy security products only
   
8. Build Capabilities: research, training and education
   
9. Do not start over: Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI - Bush administration), is a good starting point
   

Some additional articles on the same subject: 

TheRegister

Washington Post

Financial Times: US warned over cyber attacks

US Power grid overseer steps up cybersecurity

http://www.fcw.com/online/news/153154-1.html
The organization that oversees reliability for the nation’s electrical power grid is stepping up its cybersecurity efforts by setting up a new program office and creating a task force to review cybersecurity standards for the power industry.The North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC), a quasi-governmental coalition that operates under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), said it will establish a Critical Infrastructure Program, which includes cybersecurity, as its fourth program focus area. One of the program’s initiatives will be hiring a chief security officer to be a single point of contact for cyber and infrastructure issues related to the national electric power grid.NERC represents stakeholders, primarily utilities, involved in ensuring electric power reliability. In July 2006, FERC designated the corporation as the nation’s electric reliability organization. The corporation also serves as home to the Electric Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center, one of 17 national centers devoted to critical infrastructure sectors identified under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

NERC CEO announces plan to improve response to cyber security and CIP

http://uaelp.pennnet.com/display_article/334315/22/ARTCL/none/none/1/NERC-CEO-announces-plan-to-improve-response-to-cyber-security-and-CIP/
Princeton, NJ, July 15, 2008 -- Rick Sergel, president and CEO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), recently announced the organization's plans to improve its response to cyber security and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) concerns for the bulk power system in North America. Revealed to NERC's board of trustees and stakeholders in a letter last week, the plan outlines six specific actions that will lay the foundation for improving grid reliability by enabling faster and more effective action to protect critical assets from cyber or physical threats.
The actions arise from NERC's recent interaction with various organizations, including the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the House Homeland Security Committee, whose efforts have been instrumental in emphasizing the urgency and priority of this critical issue.
"Cyber security is a critical component of grid reliability, but is, by its nature, fundamentally different from any other reliability concern we currently address through our standards, analysis, or enforcement programs," said Sergel. "It therefore requires a different approach; one that allows for more expedient treatment of critical information, urgent action on standards, and more thorough threat analysis and risk assessment."
"As the Electric Reliability Organization in the U.S. and home to the Electric Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC), we are seeking to enhance and focus our existing efforts by putting the organizational structure in place to better support a more comprehensive treatment of these critical issues," he continued. "One of our key initiatives in this area is the recent formation of the Electric Sector Steering Group (ESSG), comprised of five industry chief executives, a NERC board member, and of which I am the chairman. The group will be instrumental in guiding NERC as we execute the plans announced today."
Specific actions NERC will take include:
Increasing NERC expertise on CIP and cyber security -- NERC will formally establish the CIP program as one of NERC's program functions, alongside existing standards development, compliance and enforcement, and reliability assessment program areas. The establishment of the program will include the staffing of a chief security officer position, who will serve as the single point of contact for the industry, the ESSG, and government regulators and stakeholders seeking to communicate with NERC on cyber and infrastructure security matters.
Consider alternative standard setting process for cyber security standards -- NERC will establish a task force to review, and where appropriate recommend, a standard setting process for cyber security that will include an emergency/crisis standards setting process. The process must provide a level of due process and technical review, but also provide the speed necessary to establish standards quickly and respond seamlessly to government agencies in the U.S. and Canada.
Expedited review of existing cyber standards -- Working through the Standards Committee, NERC also seeks to accelerate the comprehensive review of its eight existing CIP standards to fully incorporate the directives from FERC, including the consideration of the extent to which elements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards should be incorporated therein or within new standards.
Facilitate joint collaboration on cyber security -- NERC, working with FERC and relevant governmental authorities in Canada, will organize a briefing for the ESSG, the NERC CEO, and senior level utility executives across all stakeholder groups on cyber security threats.

Energy "Cyber Security: Are We Doing Enough"

http://uaelp.pennnet.com/display_article/330162/34/ARTCL/none/none/1/Cyber-Security:-Are-We-Doing-Enough?/

We can’t afford to live in a virtual world when it comes to cyber attacks on our electric grid—this pain would be real. A disruption of our critical infrastructure would be life threatening and could cripple our economy.
U.S. utilities know this and are working around the clock to ensure the safety of their networks and systems. Yes, the electric power system is vulnerable but with constant vigilance and sound cyber security policies we can protect the grid—we just have to be sure we are doing enough.

Last year, the number of cyber attacks on utilities per day almost doubled, according to SecureWorks, a managed security services provider to more than 1,800 clients, including 100 utilities. From January through April 2007, the company blocked an average of 49 attackers per utility client per day, while from May through September of that year, it saw an average of 93 unique hackers attempting attacks on each of its utility clients per day.

UK CPNI: new SCADA guidelines available

SCADA: CPNI has recently updated their guidelines on SCADA protection. I find these are among the best guidelines I have never read on the subject, as they mainly focus on the Strategy, Processes, Organization and People.

Here is the list of the 8 available guidelines (the Title is also the link to the Guideline):

Process control and SCADA security - General Guidance
An overarching summary to the following guidance documents

Process control and SCADA security guide 1 - Understand the Business Risk
The first step in improving the security of process control systems is to gain a thorough understanding of the business risk in the context of electronic security. Business risk is a function of threats, impacts and vulnerabilities. Only with a good knowledge of the business risk can an organisation make informed decisions on what should be the appropriate levels of security protection.

Process control and SCADA security guide 2 - Implement Secure Architecture
Designing a secure architecture for a control system can be a difficult exercise as there are so many different types of systems in existence and so many possible solutions, some of which might not be appropriate for the process control environment. Given limited resources it is important that the selection process ensures that the level of protection is commensurate with the business risk and does not rely on one single security measure for its defence.

Firewall deployment for SCADA and process control networks
This guide, produced by the former NISCC, documents the pros and cons of architectures used to separate the SCADA and process control network from the Enterprise network. These range from hosts with dual network interface cards to multi-tiered combinations using firewalls, switches and routers.

Process control and SCADA security guide 3 - Establish Response Capabilities
The capability to respond to both alerts and incidents is an important part of a process control security framework. Obtaining management support, determining responsibilities, establishing communication channels, drafting policies, and procedures, identifying pre-defined actions, providing suitable training and exercising the whole process prior to incidents enables a quick, effective and appropriate response which can minimise the business impacts and their cost, possibly avoiding such incidents taking place in the future.

Process control and SCADA security guide 4 - Improve Awareness and Skills
Raising awareness is potentially the single most valuable action in the ongoing task of process control security. Raising awareness endeavours to ensure all relevant personnel have sufficient knowledge of process control system security and the potential business impact of lapses in security. Personnel need to know what to do to prevent attacks and what to do in the event of an incident.

Process control and SCADA security guide 5 - Manage Third Party Risk
The security of an organisation's process control systems can be put at significant risk by third parties, e.g. vendors, support organisation and other links in the supply chain, and therefore warrants considerable attention. Technologies that allow greater interconnectivity, such as dial-up access or the internet, bring new threats from outside of the organisation. Third parties must therefore be engaged as part of the process control security programme and steps should be taken to reduce the associated risk.

Process control and SCADA security guide 6 - Engage Projects
Process control systems are usually installed with an expectation of a long service life and minimal changes to these systems during their lifetime. However saying this for all control systems in use is probably an over generalisation. In many organisations there are often a number of process control system related projects underway at any point in time, any of which could have security implications.

Process control and SCADA security guide 7 - Establish Ongoing Governance
Formal governance for the management of process control systems security will ensure that a consistent and appropriate approach is followed throughout the organisation. Without such governance the protection of process control systems can be ad-hoc or insufficient, and expose the organisation to additional risk.

Utility Automation & Engineering T&D - NERC statement on cyber security hearing

Utility Automation & Engineering T&D - NERC statement on cyber security hearing: "NERC statement on cyber security hearing
Princeton, NJ, June 3, 2008 -- Rick Sergel, president & CEO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), made a statement in reference to the hearing of the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology.
'At NERC, our mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America. We fully recognize and appreciate the importance of the reliability and security of our continent's bulk power infrastructure to public safety, economic health, and the lifestyle we enjoy. We share the subcommittee's commitment to ensuring that consumers can continue to rely on electric infrastructure as being safe, secure, and reliable."

Did Hackers Cause the 2003 Northeast Blackout? Umm, No - from Wired.com

Did Hackers Cause the 2003 Northeast Blackout? Umm, No Threat Level from Wired.com: "Did Hackers Cause the 2003 Northeast Blackout? Umm, No"

I found this article appeared on Wired.com blog, quite interesting and I decided to post it after I reported an article on the suspects that the Chinese People Liberation Army could be behind some of the most important US blackouts. It provides a very different perspective on the discussion.

Congress Alarmed At Cyber-Vulnerability Of Power Grid - Forbes.com

Congress Alarmed At Cyber-Vulnerability Of Power Grid - Forbes.com: "Congress Alarmed At Cyber-Vulnerability Of Power Grid
[...]
"I think we could search far and wide and not find a more disorganized response to a national security issue of this import," said Rep. James Langevin (D-R.I.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology. He pointed a finger to several groups: the DHS for giving scanty details of its video-taped simulation; the power industry for working too slowly to mitigate the threat; and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, an industry group, for failing in its role as the self-regulatory body assigned to ensure a consistent national power supply. "Everything about the way this vulnerability was handled … leaves me with little confidence that we're ready or willing to deal with the cyber security threat," he said.
The House's criticisms focused primarily on the electric utility industry group, NERC. They argued that the advisories issued by NERC are ineffective and that it has repeatedly misled the House in its investigation of the Aurora vulnerability.